Securosis Blog

Database Security Fundamentals: Patching

Adrian Lane · March 10, 2010

Patching is a critical security operation for databases, just like for any other application. The vast majority of security concerns and logic flaws within the database will be addressed by the database vendor. While the security and IT communities are made aware of critical security flaws in databases, and may even understand the exploits, the details of the fix are never made public except for open source databases. That means the vendor is your only option for fixes and workarounds. Most of…

To stir the pot a bit before the RSA Conference, I did a FireStarter wondering out loud if social media would ever replace big industry conferences. Between the comments and my experiences last week, I’d say no. Though I can say social media provides the opportunity to make business acquaintances into friends and let loudmouths like Rich, Adrian and myself make a living having on an opinion (often 3 or 4 between us).

Is It Wireless Security or Secure Wireless?

Mike Rothman · March 9, 2010

As I’ve been digesting all I saw and heard last week at the RSA show, the major topic of wireless security re-emerged with a vengeance. To be honest, wireless security had kind of fallen off my radar for a while. Between most of the independent folks being acquired (both on the wireless security and wireless infrastructure sides) and lots of other shiny objects, there just wasn’t that much to worry about.

We’re happy to post the next SecurosisTV episode, in which yours truly goes through the Low Hanging Fruit of Endpoint Security. This is a pretty high-level view of the 7 different tactics (discussed in much more detail in the post), intended to give you a quick (6 minute) perspective on how to improve endpoint security posture with minimal effort.

It is better to stay silent and let people think you are an idiot than to open your mouth and remove all doubt.

On the eve of perhaps the biggest conference we security folks have (RSA Conference), we wanted to bait the echo chamber a bit, and wonder what the future of conferences is – especially given the amount and depth of information that is available via blogs and social media. Interestingly enough, we don’t necessarily have a consistent opinion here, but we want to hear what the community has to say.

Securosis at RSA Conference 2010

Mike Rothman · March 1, 2010

Rich, Mike, and Adrian keep pretty busy schedules at RSA each year, so we are likely to be quiet on the blog this week. If you happen to be at the show, here are the speaking sessions and other appearances we’ll be doing throughout the week. Hopefully you’ll come up and say “Hi.” Rich and Adrian don’t bite.

RSAC 2010 Guide: Compliance

Rich · February 26, 2010

And this is it : the final piece of the Securosis Guide to the RSA Conference 2010. Yes, there will be a lot to see at the show, and we hope this guide has been helpful for those planning to be in San Francisco. For those of you not able to attend, we’d like to think getting a feel for the major trends in each of our coverage areas wasn’t a total waste of time.

Friday Summary: February 26, 2010

Adrian Lane · February 25, 2010

Next week is the RSA conference. You might have noticed from some of our recent blog entries. And I am really looking forward to it. It’s one of my favorite events, but I am especially anxious for good food. Yes, I want to see a bunch of friends, and yes, I have a lot of vendors I am anxious to catch up with to chat ‘bout some of their products. But honestly, all that takes a back seat to food. I like living in Arizona, but the food here sucks. Going to San Francisco, even the small…

Retro Buffoonery

Mike Rothman · February 25, 2010

I’m probably not supposed to do this, as I took the security marketer’s oath to get my first VP Marketing gig. But I’m going to pull the curtain back on some of the wacky stuff vendors do to sell their product/services. Today’s specific tactic is what I’ll dub retro buffoonery, which is when a vendor looks back in time, and states that they could have stopped attack X, Y and Z – if only their products were deployed before the attack.